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Nayha Acharya*

Law's Treatment of Science: From
Idealization to Understanding

Increasing reliance on scientific evidence in litigation has created a demand for
discussions directed at enabling a legitimate interaction between science and law
The article develops the notion of procedural legitimacy-that adherence to legal
procedure maintains the legitimacy of the adjudicative system and its outcomes
-and applies it to determining how best to admit and use scientific evidence.
The problem of undervaluing procedural legitimacy is illustrated through a
commentary on contributions to the science and law discussion of Edmond and
Roach, and Haack. The author's thesis is that maintaining adjudicative legitimacy
depends on procedural rules being applied as vigilantly to science as to any
other evidence. Accordingly, admissibility rules must be properly applied to
scientific evidence and, once admitted, the evidence must be scrutinized and
weighed against the legal standard of proof. The recommendations for treatment
of scientific evidence in the Goudge Inquiry Report are endorsed based on their
consistency with the demands of procedural legitimacy.
L'importance accrue donnde aux preuves scientifiques dans les litiges a cr66
une demande pour des discussions visant j favoriser une interaction 16gitime
entre la science et le droit. L'article prend comme point de ddpart la M6gitimit6
proc6durale-la certitude que le respect de la procddure Iegale preserve
la Iegitimitd du syst~me d6cisionnel et de ses rdsultats-et l'applique pour
d~terminer la meilleure fagon d'admettre et dutiliser les preuves scientifiques. Le
probl~me r6sultant de la sous-6valuation de la Idgitimitd procedurale est illustr6
par des commentaires sur les contributions de la science et du droit de MM.
Edmond et Mme Roach, et Haack. L'auteure avance la those que pour preserver
la /dgitimit6 ddcisionnelle, les r~gles procedurales doivent 6tre appliqudes aussi
rigoureusement aux preuves scientifiques qu'aux preuves de toute autre nature.
Par consdquent, les r~gles d'admissibilit6 doivent 6tre appliqudes de fagon
appropride aux preuves scientifiques et, une fois admis, les didments de preuve
doivent 6tre examinds et 6valuds selon la norme Idgale de preuve. L'article appuie
les recommandations concernant le traitement des preuves scientifiques dans le
rapport de la commission d'enqu6te Goudge, etant donnd qu'elles satisfont aux
exigences de la ldgitimit6 procddurale.
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Introduction
The temptation to borrow legitimacy from science is hard to resist. When
science is understood as a passionate though objective inquiry into truth,
it is hard to imagine a more desirable conclusion than the one reached
scientifically. Scientific conclusions have an air of legitimacy that
other fields of inquiry can not help but envy, and law is no exception.
The discussions surrounding science and law, both in case law and
commentaries, contain the sentiment that consistency with science
enhances the legitimacy of adjudicative decisions. Certainly, it is desirable
to avoid legal decisions that are blatantly contrary to scientific knowledge.
It is problematic, however, to idealize science as a source of legitimacy
such that the internal legitimacy of the legal process is itself overlooked.
When that occurs, the stage is set for the legal process's own legitimacy
to be threatened.
I suggest that both law's legitimacy and science's legitimacy are
found in their adherence to their respective procedural rules: an inquiry
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can be legitimately "scientific" when it follows certain scientific rules and
procedures, even if the conclusion arrived at is later disproven. Similarly,
following procedural rules maintains the legitimacy of adjudicative
decisions, even if some substantive wrong occurs. For instance, if a
plaintiff is wronged by a defendant, but the evidence properly presented at
trial does not suggest that the defendant is more likely liable than not, then
his case will be dismissed. In that situation, the plaintiff's rights were not
vindicated (i.e., a substantive wrong occurs), but the integrity of the legal
process is unaffected as long as appropriate procedures were followed in
hearing the plaintiff's case.
Caught up in an idealization of science, however, judges and
commentators have been led to suggest changes to legal procedures in
an effort to better accommodate science, without considering whether
their suggested solutions compromise law's own legitimacy. In light of
this concern, and in an effort to move away from idealization towards
a better understanding, I will elucidate the similarity between law and
science that I have suggested: both accept that they operate in conditions
of uncertainty, despite which, both scientific and legal outcomes maintain
legitimacy through adherence to procedure. I refer to this concept in this
paper as "procedural legitimacy."
A consideration of procedural legitimacy leads to an appreciation
of a significant difference between science and law: while science seeks
empirical reality, law seeks to establish legal facts as defined by substantive
law, which then culminate in a legal determination. Failure to appreciate
the different enterprises of science and law, along with a nonappreciation
that adherence to legal procedure maintains the legitimacy of adjudicative
decisions, results in a susceptibility to prefer science as a better truthseeking enterprise than law, causing an inappropriate idealization and
deference to science. In an effort to illustrate that susceptibility, I will
demonstrate how it has influenced the commentaries of Susan Haack' and
the joint commentary of Edmond and Roach,2 both of which have made
provocative contributions to the science and law discussion.

1.
To illustrate Susan Haack's contribution, I rely on: Susan Haack, "Irreconcilable Differences?
The Troubled Marriage of Science and Law" (2009) 72 Law & Contemp Probs 1 [Haack,
"Irreconcilable Differences"]; Haack, "Truth and Justice, Inquiry and Advocacy, Science and Law"
in Putting Philosophy to Work-Inquiry and its Place in Culture (Amherst, NY Prometheus Books,
2009) [Haack, "Truth and Justice"]; and Haack, "Entangled in the Bramble-Bush, Science in the
Law" in Defending Science Within Reason (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003) at 233 [Haack,
"Entangled"].
2.
Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, "A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's
Forensic Science and Medical Evidence" (2011) 61 UTLJ 343 [Edmond & Roach].
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After providing a critique of these commentaries on the basis that they
improperly underappreciate procedural legitimacy in law, I will apply the
concept of procedural legitimacy to the science and law interaction. My
application will draw from the recommendations in the Goudge Inquiry
into PediatricForensic Pathology,' as my impression is that it presents
a balanced and principled assessment of the science and law interaction,
resulting in useful recommendations regarding the court's use of science.
My discussion begins with a brief account of the major developments
in Canadian case law in respect of the science and law interaction. The
preliminary section is intended to summarize the case law that will assist
in appreciating the upcoming discussion, and is also itself illustrative of
the idealization of science implicit in judicial comments.
I. Highlightsfrom Canadiancase law
The science and law discussion is generally situated in the rules
surrounding admissibility of expert evidence. Sopinka J. in R v Mohan4
set out the current test for admissibility of expert evidence in Canada.
Under the Mohan analysis, experts are permitted to state opinions as an
exception to the rule disallowing admissibility of opinion evidence. To fall
within the exception, the expert's testimony must fulfill four criteria. First,
the subject of the expert's opinion must be relevant. Relevance includes
logical relevance, meaning the evidence must tend to prove a fact at issue.
Relevance additionally includes legal relevance-the probative value of
the expert's opinion must outweigh any prejudicial impact it may have.
Second, along with relevance, the expert's testimony must be necessary
to the trier of fact (i.e., outside of the scope of a layman's knowledge).
Third, the expert must be qualified to give the opinions offered. Fourth, if
no other exclusionary rule is applicable to exclude the expert's evidence,
then the opinion is admissible.
Along with setting out the test for admissibility of scientific evidence
generally, Sopinka J. cautions of the danger of misuse of expert evidence
in Mohan: "Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does
not easily understand and submitted through a witness of impressive
antecedents,"' it could distort the fact-finding process as juries would
naturally give excessive weight to such evidence. In other words: triers
of fact are susceptible to idealize scientific-looking evidence and fail to
evaluate

it

appropriately,

resulting

in

fact-finding

distortion.

Anticipating

3. Ontario, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, vol 3 (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 2008) (Chair: Stephen T Goudge) ch 18 [Goudge Inquiry].
4.
[1994] 2 SCR 9 [Mohan].
5. Ibid at 19.
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this distortion to the fact-finding process, Sopinka J. further comments
that a novel scientific technique should be subjected to "special scrutiny
to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability."' Despite the
fact that there is no mention of reliability in Sopinka's articulation of the
test for admissibility of expert evidence, his cautionary comments relating
to threshold reliability set the stage for reliability becoming increasingly
important in the science and law discussion in Canada.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to comment on admissibility
of scientific evidence in its 2000 decision in R v J LJ.' While Mohan had
left the landmark American decision Daubert unmentioned, the Supreme
Court interpreted Mohan in JLJ as having rendered the Canadian
approach parallel to the Daubert analysis of "reliable foundation."9 In
Daubert,Blackmun J. had called on trial judges to use scientific constructs
to determine whether scientific evidence was scientifically reliable, and
therefore, admissible. The questions that the trial judge was to ask were:
(1) Has the technique or theory been tested-i.e., subjected to the scientific
concept of falsification? (2) Has the theory or technique been published
or peer reviewed? (3) Does the scientific technique have a known or
potential rate of error? (4) Is the theory or technique generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community?'o This marked the beginning of using
scientific criteria to address legal reliability.
While the Court in J LJ was careful to indicate that its intention was
not to change the Mohan analysis, the two approaches were amalgamated
in a 2007 decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench." This
amalgamation was not intended to represent a strict test to be invariably
applied, but it provides a useful synopsis of the considerations that could
be relevant to admissibility of expert evidence, representing the Mohan
analysis, supplemented by JLJCriterion I. Relevance to an issue
A. Does the evidence meet the threshold of logical relevance?
B. Does the evidence meet the threshold of reliability?
a. Is the opinion based on novel science?
b. Does the opinion evidence pertain to the ultimate issue?
c. Does the novel science attain threshold reliability?
[Daubertfactors]
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ibid at 28.
[2000] 2 SCR 600 at 28, 33 [JLJ|.
Daubertv Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 US 579 (1993) [Daubert].
JLI, supranote 7.
Daubert,supranote 8.
R v Wood, [2007] AJ 895 at 50.
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i. Has the theory/technique been tested?
ii. Has the theory or technique been subject to peer
review/published?
iii. Is there a known or potential error rate?
iv. Is the theory/technique generally accepted?
C. Do the costs of admitting the evidence outweigh the benefits?
Criterion II. Necessary to assist the trier of fact.
A. Is the subject matter of the expert opinion beyond that of the
trier of fact?
Criterion III. Absence of any exclusionary rule
Criterion IV. Properly qualified expert.
If Mohan and the subsequent cases are taken to mean that the reliability
analysis need only be undertaken for novel scientific evidence, then the R v
Trochym12 decision is an expansion of the reliability principle: in Trochym,
the Supreme Court recognized the fluidity of science. Translated into a
comment on admissibility, a technique or theory that may have once been
admissible may later be inadmissible, because of the fluid and evolving
nature of science."
In Trochym, a threshold reliability analysis resulted in exclusion
of evidence that was extracted through hypnosis technique. Trochym
added that along with novel scientific evidence, a reliability evaluation
should take place where reliability is unclear or has been challenged. The
majority of the Supreme Court upheld the inadmissibility ruling of the
post-hypnotic evidence despite the concerns expressed by the dissenting
judges that hypnosis evidence was in fact well established; it had already
been scrutinized by the courts and had been admitted before.' 4 It could be
suggested, therefore, that the legal value for precedent had been trumped
by the requirement to establish scientific validity and, considering the
evolving nature of science, this seems appropriate.
The development of Canadian case law illustrates the sentiment that
science is both probative and prejudicial. The prejudicial impact was
first articulated in Mohan, wherein Sopinka J. suggested that notable
credentials along with scientific language impress triers of fact. So, instead
of evaluating evidence, triers of fact may simply side with one scientific
expert or another, diluting the fact-finding process to a battle of experts.
This problem is augmented when evidence cloaked as science finds its
way into the trial process. The credentials of the expert, coupled with
12.
13.
14.

[2007] 1 SCR 239 [Trochym].
Ibid at 31.
Rv Clarke, [1984] AJ 19,13 CCC (3d) 117 (ABQB).
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language "dressed up" with scientific terms, can cause lay triers of fact
to give too much weight to such evidence, erroneously thinking that it is
indeed "scientific." The concerns surrounding the prejudicial impact of
science can thus be summed up as the fear of the idealization of scienceif triers of fact assume that evidence is "scientific," they are susceptible to
being disproportionately swayed by that evidence.
In order to curtail the prejudicial impact, trial judges have been called
on to act as vigilant gatekeepers-it is the trial judge's job to prevent
distorting evidence from reaching the trial process. In order to do so,
judges have been asked to apply scientific criteria to evidence at the
admissibility stage and assess whether evidence is scientifically reliable
or not. If the evidence passes the scientifically reliable test, then it is
admissible. If not, then the evidence should be prevented from entering the
trial process. But while the prejudicial effect of science is thought to arise
from triers of fact being susceptible to idealizing science and deferring
unduly to scientific evidence, the gatekeeping solution provided similarly
displays an idealization of science by incorporating scientific constructs
into legal reasoning, suggesting that scientific reliability brings legitimacy
to evidence.
Clearly, the legal system has not escaped the idealization of science.
In an effort to minimize idealization in order to move towards a more
apposite understanding of how the two fields ought to interact, in the
next section I show that science and law share an important similaritylegitimacy through procedure.
II. Procedurallegitimacy in science and law
In this section I demonstrate that although both law and science must value
accuracy in their respective enterprises, both fields operate in conditions of
uncertainty. Both fields internally accept their conditions of uncertainty,
and despite the uncertainty, both are able to produce legitimate outcomes
through adherence to procedure. And although the two fields share this
feature of procedural legitimacy, they are quite different in their ultimate
inquiries.
1. Procedurallegitimacy in science: legitimate outcomes despite
uncertainty
Most generally, science is understood as an inquiry aimed at determining
empirical truth. Surely, however, it cannot be said that anyone seeking to
discover an empirical reality, by that desire alone, conducts science. For
an inquiry to be scientific, and thus distinct from other forms of inquiry,
it must have distinctive characteristics so that it can be legitimately
understood as "scientific." The scientific method, "consisting in systematic
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observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing,
and modification of hypotheses,"'" can be considered the distinctive
feature that makes a scientist's inquiry scientific and distinguishes it from
other forms of inquiry. This definition of the scientific method arises out of
a concept called "falsification" which constitutes the conventional concept
of how science does and ought to progress.'" Falsification is, therefore,
sometimes referred to as the philosophy of science. The concept of
falsification demonstrates the uncertainty inherent in scientific inquiry. It is
most useful to demonstrate this by describing why the original concept that
induction was the method of scientific progress gave way to falsification.
Prior to falsification, the popular theory for conducting scientific
inquiry was based on Newton's concept of induction. Induction can be
summarized as making generalizations based on observations alone. But
induction has to be based on observable phenomena-without something
observable, there is no way to induct a conclusion." That would mean
that science could not deal with phenomena that are beyond observationlike the atom, or the surface of the moon, before the technology advanced
enough to make these observable.
Challenging the view that induction could be termed the scientific
method, Karl Popper popularized the concept of falsification.'" This method
of reasoning provides for indirect evidence and logic to allow for nonobservable phenomena to be scientifically tested. Essentially, falsification
allows for unobservable events to be tested based on predictions that can
be observed. A scientist's theory thus takes this shape: if he is right in
his explanation of phenomenon X, then he should observe Y, Y being the
observable prediction. If he does not observe Y, then the theory is falsified.
If he does observe Y, then his conclusion must be that his theory is not
falsified, but he cannot conclude that the theory is proven.
Inherent in the concept of falsification, therefore, is ongoing
uncertainty. The presumption is that a theory cannot be proven (it can
only be falsified). Current scientific philosophy (i.e., that science does and

15. The Oxford English Dictionary, online: <http://www.oed.com>, sub verbo "scientific method."
16. My central purpose in this section is to illustrate that procedure has a significant role in
legitimizing inquiries as scientific, even in the face of uncertain outcomes, in accordance with the
most prominent philosophical account of science-Popper's theory of falsification (see note 18).
However, I acknowledge that there are differing philosophical models of science and scientific
progress, particularly those based on historical and sociological perspectives. See, for instance,
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientfic Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), or
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: An Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (London: NLB,
1978).
17. Peter Kosso, A Summary ofthe Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011) at 9-10.
18. Karl Popper, The Logic ofScientific Discovery, 5th ed (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd, 1968).
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should progress through falsification) recognizes, therefore, that despite
being an inquiry into the truth, there is no way to guarantee that the truth
has been found. How is it that an inquiry into truth can still be legitimate,
justifiable and progressive, despite its inherent recognition that truth is
always elusive? The answer lies in scientists adhering to the rules and
procedures that are born of falsification, or the philosophy of scientific
progress.
The philosophy of falsification as the appropriate method of scientific
inquiry gave rise to the particular methodologies that are currently taught
and generally accepted in the scientific community as the scientific
method' 9: the methodology of testing hypotheses.2 0 Testing hypotheses
involves four essential elements: observation, development of hypothesis,
making logical predictions, and using experiments to test the hypothesis.
The experiments used to test the hypothesis must be conducted in a
reproducible manner-there must be experimental controls that make
the observations used to test the hypothesis reliable and repeatable. 2'
Once the data is obtained from the experiment, it should be analyzed and
interpreted, leading to a conclusion whereby a new hypothesis can be
formulated.22 Once concluded, the results should be published, and the
repeatability of the results should be tested.
Adherence to the scientific method, including the validity of
experimental designs, is internally governed through peer review. 23 A
scientist's peers evaluate whether appropriate methodology was followed
while conducting a scientific study. Peer review, Ziman suggests, keeps
science "reasonably honest and factually reliable... but it does not pretend
to eliminate error, nor does it guarantee certainty or truth." 24 What this
means is that uncertainty is accepted in the scientific community, but the

19. I do not claim any expertise over scientific method and falsification. For the purpose of this
paper, the simplified understanding of the scientific method that I present will suffice. For a more
detailed account, see generally, Popper, supra note 18.
20. John Ziman, Real Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 226.
21. Kosso, supranote 17 at 14-20.
22. Ibid.
23. Ziman, supranote 20 at 42-43.
24. Ibid.
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work of scientists is, nonetheless, legitimately scientific if it follows the
current accepted methodologies, or rules of procedure.25
Thus, when Susan Haack suggests that there is no scientific method
that guarantees success, her conclusion is defensible. But the suggestion
that while science has a "'free-ranging,' 'just do it' improving character"
compared to law, which is "highly regimented, conducted under formal
rules of procedure," draws an unfitting distinction between science and
law. 26 Scientific validity can be thought of as depending on following a
method consisting of rules and procedures in a similar way that law does.
In the next section, I will demonstrate how the legal process too maintains
legitimate outcomes despite conditions of uncertainty by adhering to valid
legal procedures.
2. Procedurallegitimacy in law: legitimate outcomes despite
uncertainty
Adjudicative decision-making occurs through a process of fact-finding,
so accurate fact-finding is important to the legal process. As Stein puts it:
''accuracy in fact-finding is a logical prerequisite to proper administration
of the controlling substantive law."27 If adjudicative decision-makers were
consistently inaccurate in their fact-finding, their subsequent application
of substantive laws would be based on inaccuracies, making protection of
substantive rights impossible. Since protection of substantive rights must
be an aim of the trial process, promoting accuracy in fact-finding must
also be fundamental to that process. But accuracy is not always possible,
considering the need for timely dispute resolution, economic constraints,
and numerous sources of error that exist within the adjudicative process.

25. As stated in note 16, there are differing perspectives on science that suggest that scientific
method is not universally applied, and Popper's theory of falsification may be an incomplete and,
therefore, idealized interpretation of science, because it ignores the social and political influences
that impact scientific progress. I recognize the utility of a more nuanced understanding of science
generally; however, my purpose herein is to illustrate the concept of procedural legitimacy that can
be demonstrable in the context of science, even in its idealized form. My purpose is not to engage
in the debate between science as a representation of natural reality and science as a social and
political construct. For useful commentaries that do so engage, see Sheila Jasenoff, Science at the
Bar (Cambridge, MA: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995); Gary Edmond, "Judicial Representations of
Scientific Evidence" (2000) 63 Mod L Rev 216; and David Caudill & Lewis LaRue, No Magic Wand:
The Idealization ofScience in the Law (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
26. Haack, "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note I at 8, 14. In support of her contention that
science is not methodologically bound, Haack relies on the comments of Paul Feyerabend, Against
Method: An Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (London: NLB, 1978). Feyerabend's
comments represent a critique of the more conventional notion of scientific method. Though
provocative, his comments do not represent the most prevailing current view, which is my focus.
27. Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 2.
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Consequently, although it is undoubtedly important to strive for accuracy,
fact-finding occurs in circumstances of uncertainty.28
Fact-finding (and the resulting adjudicative decision) is based on
whatever evidence is presented at trial. As such, the uncertainty that is
present in the legal process manifests as evidentiary gaps. These gaps
result in potential inaccuracy in fact-finding. Evidentiary gaps have a
number of sources.29
First, there is the practical issue that a crime or a civil claim arises from
an event that occurred in the past, so it is not possible to simply observe an
event and determine what happened.30 The event has to be reconstructed
from fragments of available evidence. Moreover, admissibility rules
sometimes restrict what might otherwise be useful evidence in order to
protect some other legal principle. For instance, incriminating evidence
that is obtained through an improper search or seizure is constitutionally
inadmissible, 3' even if the evidence obtained from the improper search
would reduce the factual uncertainty surrounding the truth of the crime.
Similarly, evidence subject to privilege is not admissible. Therefore, facts
must be found without that evidence, though the inadmissible evidence
might make the fact-finding more accurate. In short, the legal system
accepts the inevitability of evidentiary gaps-sometimes it even causes
them.
The legal system's acceptance of the uncertainty that results from
evidentiary gaps is self-evident when considering the burdens of proof
required to establish each element of a substantive right or a crime. In civil
cases, an event is considered a legal fact if it is more likely to have occurred
than not occurred. That means that in civil cases, a chance of inaccuracy of
up to forty-nine per cent is accepted. That is, there is up to a forty-nine per
cent chance that an event found as a legal fact is not a "fact" in reality. In
the criminal context, elements of crimes have to be established "beyond a
reasonable doubt." For the sake of illustration, assume that this means the
standard of proof is ninety-five per cent. If the trier of fact concludes that

28. Ibid at 2.
29. Larry Laudan, Truth, Errorand Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 16. In the discussion to follow, I refer to Laudan in respect of
his description of the adjudicative process, which I found illuminating and helpful. However, my
supposition of procedural legitimacy is contrary to Laudan's ultimate purpose, which is premised on
the truth-seeking function of a trial and ultimately seeks to minimize adjudicative inconsistencies with
factual reality, or truth.
30. Recall the discussion above wherein induction, or ascertaining conclusions based on observation
alone, was not possible for science either.
31. Canadian Charterof Human Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 8.
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she is anywhere from zero to ninety-four per cent sure that the accused
committed the crime, then she has to acquit the accused, even though there
could be quite a high likelihood that the accused did commit the crime.32
Why is it that the legal system and all those governed by it accept this risk
of inaccuracy? How does the adjudicative process maintain its legitimacy
despite this sort of potential discrepancy between legal fact-finding and
actual fact?
One way to answer these questions is to accept that uncertainty in factfinding is simply unavoidable, and the burdens of proof represent a fair
allocation of the risk that erroneous fact-finding occurs. Stein explains that
the inevitable uncertainty in adjudicative fact-finding necessitates facts
to be found on the basis of probabilities.33 Because fact-finding is based
on probabilities as opposed to certainty, there is a risk that an act or event
that is found as a fact for legal purposes is not a fact in reality. The legal
system, therefore, must choose how to fairly allocate the chance of factfinding errors occurring.34 Laudan has described this as the "distribution of
error."3 The distribution of error is most clearly understood by considering
the burdens of proof as representing what law-makers have determined to
be a fair distribution of error.
Assume again that the burden of proof in the criminal context is ninetyfive per cent, the prosecution has to show that the accused is ninety-five per
cent likely to be guilty. This means that if there is an error, it is much more
likely to fall on the side of not-guilty than guilty, because if an accused is
found guilty, there should only be a five per cent chance that the accused
is actually innocent. It is much more likely that the accused is erroneously
found to be not-guilty than erroneously found to be guilty. The risk of error
is therefore distributed largely in favour of the accused. Society will bear
the greater risk of errors, because law-makers have decided that wrongful
convictions are to be more strenuously avoided than false acquittals. Based
on the same principle, in civil cases setting the burden of proof at fifty-one
per cent (for the sake of illustration) means that if an error (i.e., a legal fact
is found that does not correspond to what really happened) is to occur, it is
slightly more likely to occur in favour of the defendant. If there is to be an
error, it is slightly more likely that the error will disadvantage the plaintiff,
as law-makers have decided that the accuser should bear slightly more of
the risk of erroneous fact-finding.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Laudan, supra note 29.
Stein, supra note 27 at 2.
Ibid.
Laudan, supra note 29 at 123.
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So far, the discussion in this part can be summarized thus: there is
uncertainty in adjudicative fact-finding; uncertainty means that there
is a risk of error; this risk ought to be fairly allocated among litigants.
This seems to be an accurate description of how the legal system handles
its conditions of uncertainty. This description is incomplete, however,
because it suggests that conditions of uncertainty result in the legal
system being inevitably flawed and that fair allocation of risk is the bandaid covering the errors that will inevitably result. I suggest, however,
that when adjudicative decisions are made based on legal facts that do
not correspond with actual reality, such decisions are not necessarily
illegitimate. Adjudicative decisions made based on inaccurate fact-finding
are nonetheless legitimate legal decisions if they adhere to procedural
rules, much in the same way as scientific outcomes can be legitimately
scientific even if they do not represent the factual reality.
The legal process implicitly recognizes that adjudicative outcomes
that do not correspond with factual reality can still be legitimate. Although
the proposition may seem distasteful, it becomes more palatable by
acknowledging that the standards of proof, which anticipate uncertainty
in fact-finding, are part of the substantive element of laws. What has
to be proven and to what extent it has to be proven for the purposes of
adjudicative decision-making are defined in the substantive law. For
instance, substantive law dictates that to convict an accused of assault,
the accused's intention to assault, along with the assault itself, must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the civil context, to grant a remedy
for an action in negligence, the substantive law dictates that existence of
a duty of care, breach of standard of care, causation (including lack of
remoteness), and harm must all be proven on a balance of probabilities"more likely than not."
When the evidence establishes the elements of the substantive law to
the relevant standard of proof, these elements become legal facts-they
are understood to be proven, and are accepted as facts in the legal context.
The law is then enforced (a conviction or acquittal is entered, a remedy is
allowed or disallowed) based on the legal facts that have been established
through the evidence, and how the evidence measures up to the standard
of proof. Fact-finding is thus a process dedicated to finding legal facts for
the purpose of vindicating legal rights and enforcing laws. The substantive
elements of the law-includingthe standardofproof-define those rights
and laws.
Consequently, an adjudicative decision is legitimate when the factfinder makes a decision based on the evidence that is properly before her at
trial and appropriately measures that evidence to the relevant standard of
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proof.36 Whether the adjudicative decision corresponds with factual reality
does not itself compromise the legitimacy of the resulting adjudicative
decision. Of course, a legal decision can be illegitimate or improper. If
there were some procedural problem with what evidence was relied on
and how it was construed, then the adjudicative outcome would not be
valid. For instance, if a jury relied on evidence that it should not have,
or if they misunderstood the standard of proof and did not measure the
evidence against it appropriately, then the resulting decision is not valid."
This remains the case whether or not the legal facts that gave rise to the
decision correspond with factual reality.
In the context of the science and law discussion, this means that
admissibility of evidence rules must be appropriately applied so that the
evidence that is presented to the jury is properly put before them. If the
admissibility rules are not applied properly, it means that the trier of fact
is not measuring appropriate evidence to the relevant standard of proof,
and the legitimacy of the resultant adjudicative decision is questionable.
For instance, consider a jury that relies on evidence that is improperly
cloaked as scientific evidence (i.e., assume that the evidence is more
prejudicial than probative, and never should have been put before the jury
if the admissibility rules had been properly applied). The jury relies on the
prejudicial evidence, and becomes convinced that the accused is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. On that basis, the jury convicts the accused.
This adjudicative decision's legitimacy is compromised, whether or not
that accused really did commit the crime. If the accused did really commit
the crime, then the jury would have come to a conclusion that corresponds
with what really happened, but its decision is nonetheless invalid because
procedural rules were compromised-thejury relied on improper evidence.
The legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes is not dependent on consistency
with actual reality. The adjudicative process, premised by the substantive
law that it is to uphold, seeks to establish only that part of factual reality
that is defined by substantive law-the elements of the crime or civil law,
to be established to the relevant standard of proof. The legitimacy of the
resultant legal determination is dependent on whether the appropriate
procedures were adhered to during the decision-making process.
3. Application to the science and law interaction
The above discussion was intended to demonstrate that while both science
and law value accuracy, both operate in circumstances of inevitable
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uncertainty but are, nonetheless, able to produce valid results through
subscribing to proper procedures.
Although the foregoing exercise was designed to present the similarity
that law and science share, it has illuminated a difference between science
and law that provides a compelling reason why law ought to be very
careful when seeking legitimacy for itself in science: science and law seek
to establish different things.
Ultimately, science seeks to arrive at some empirical truth. The
procedures that arose out of the philosophy of falsification are aimed
entirely at coming closer and closer to empirical reality (though recognizing
that certain proof is elusive). The rules and procedures of the scientific
method are relevant to that goal. Law's rules and procedures are relevant to
adjudicative decision-making, which is premised on substantive laws that
define what legal facts need to be established and to what extent they have
to be established. In the legal world, "legal facts" are defined as something
different from empirical reality; there is a significant difference between
the empirical truth that science is ultimately concerned with, and legal
fact, which is what the legal process is aimed at establishing. Considering
this difference, law is considerably more accepting of uncertainty than
science-the acceptance of uncertainty is inherent in the legal definition of
"fact." But this difference between science and law does not compromise
law's legitimacy. It just means that science and law seek different things.
Without appropriately defining the difference between what science seeks
versus what law seeks it is very easy to idealize science on the basis that
it is clearly more dedicated to empirical truth than law. It is necessary to
take careful note of this distinction, because idealizing science in this way,
compared to law, can cause a blind desire for law to be consistent with
science. This desire is not inherently inappropriate, but coupled with an
underappreciation of procedural legitimacy can cause legal procedures to
be unjustifiably compromised in an effort to seek legitimacy in consistency
with science.
I suggest that Susan Haack's general suggestion that reforms to the
adversarial process ought to be considered in order for the legal system
to accommodate science better is derived from the notion that science is a
more legitimate inquiry into truth compared to law, and underemphasizes
the legitimacy of legal inquiry. Further, I suggest that Edmond and
Roach's contribution (albeit substantively very different from Haack's)
contains a similar combination of a preference for empirical inquiry and
an underemphasis of procedural legitimacy in law. This allows Edmond
and Roach to impose a fairly strict application of scientific/empirical
constructs onto legal decision-making at the admissibility of evidence
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stage. Moreover, it enables them to offer an asymmetrical approach to
expert evidence in criminal trials by imposing more strenuous procedural
rules, which effectively alter the prosecutorial burden of proof. In the next
section, I will elaborate these claims.
IlI. The commentaries ofHaack,Edmond and Roach
I . Susan Haack
[T]he core of my argument will be that there are deep tensions between
the goals and values of the scientific enterprise and the culture of the
law... between the investigative character of science and the adversarial
culture of our legal system.. .1

In developing her argument that the tense relationship between science and
the litigation process is a result of the "deep tensions between the goals and
values of the scientific enterprise and the culture of law,"3 Susan Haack
provides the insight that it is useful to consider the fundamental nature of
both science and law in order to appreciate the interaction between the two
fields. Presumably, a fundamental appreciation of both fields would reveal
the most foundational reason for the tension between them, and thereby
illuminate how best to resolve the tense interaction between science and
law. With a hint of pessimism, Haack suggests that if there is to be any
solution at all, some alteration to adversarial procedure could be useful in
easing the science and law tension.40
I suggest, however, that Haack's project is compromised, because, due
to an underemphasis on the internal legitimacy of the adjudicative system,
her illustration of the fundamental nature of law is incomplete. Haack's
description of law reflects an undervaluing of the legitimacy that law
maintains through its procedures: consistent and appropriate application
of legal procedure provides legitimacy to adjudicative decision-making,
despite the reality of uncertainty and the corresponding potential that legal
facts do not equate to actual fact. While Haack appreciates that legal inquiry
is restricted by rules of evidence, as well as time and cost considerations
(all of which can contribute to the circumstances of uncertainty),4 1she does
not duly recognize the important role of legal procedure in preserving the
legitimacy of legal decisions. Consequently, Haack's analysis is somewhat
unappreciative of law, leading to an imbalanced presentation of science

38.
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and law. The imbalance leads to adversarialism and adversarial procedure
being displayed as the root cause of the tension between science and law.
Haack starts by describing science as being in the core business of
inquiry into truth. 42 Being a field of inquiry, Haack describes the "core
values of science [as] epistemological: honesty, with oneself and others,
about what the evidence is and what it shows." 43 On the other hand, she
describes the legal system as a dispute resolution mechanism wherein
"a trial aims not to find out whether the defendant is guilty or liable,
but to arrive at a determination of the defendant's guilt or liability'determine,' here, probably being closer to 'deem' than to 'discover.'"
This characterization of a trial is consistent with my conception that the
aim of a trial is to arrive at legal facts and come to legal determinations
of guilt or liability based on those facts. The problem is that Haack does
not acknowledge the validity or legitimacy of this goal of a trial. Instead,
her discussion makes science seem valuable and esteemed compared to
law, on the basis that science and scientists, at a fundamental level at
least, are inquiring into truth in a way that law is not. And although the
focus of her work is not necessarily to provide a solution to the science
and law tension, but to critically illustrate it, her description, displaying a
relative deference to science, eventually leads her to endorse solutions that
reduce the adversarial impact on scientific evidence and thereby modify
adversarial processes when science is involved.
Despite acknowledging that the trial process is concerned with coming
to legal determinations (which, as I have argued above, can be legitimate
despite potential inconsistency with factual reality), Haack maintains that
factual truth is essential to justice and, therefore, to the legal system as the
administrator of justice. She suggests that likely nobody needs reminding
that "substantive justice requires factual truth." 45 And to determine these
factual truths, Haack suggests, law increasingly seeks the assistance of
science.46 I agree that factual accuracy is desirable in the legal process.
Still, legal decisions are made in conditions of uncertainty. Consequently,
legal facts are to be proven on the basis of the applicable standard of
proof, as opposed to a standard of truth itself This contemplates the
potential that legal facts do not equate with truth itself. So, while I may
agree that "substantive" justice requires factual truth, the legal system,
given its conditions of uncertainty that make guaranteeing factual truth
42.
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elusive, is validated through procedural legitimacy. I suggest, therefore,
that procedural legitimacy, being less dependent on factual accuracy, must
be considered a necessary counterpart to the substantive justice that the
legal system endeavours (but cannot guarantee) to uphold.
A recognition of this more nuanced nature of the legal process and
its legitimacy would have led to the perception that the "facts" that are
necessary to arrive at legal determinations are legitimately different from
the empirical truths that science seeks. Moreover, the inquiry into those
legal facts (i.e., the trial process) is also legitimate, but Haack's further
contrast between law and science does not account for this.
As part of her effort to illustrate the differences between science and
law, Haack compares the role of the lawyer (as advocate) to the role of a
scientist (as inquirer). The difference between advocacy and inquiry, she
suggests, is that the advocate must present the evidence in the light that
is most favourable to her client, and persuade the judge that she has the
best evidence. On the other hand, the scientist's role is to consider all the
evidence and "assess it as fairly as possible."47 Making a similar argument
in "Truth and Justice," Haack provides that while lawyers try to make a
case by presenting evidence persuasively, scientists seek out all available
evidence and assess it impartially.48 She suggests that even when scientists
compete with one another, their ultimate purpose remains to discover the
truth. Consequently, she makes the somewhat condemnatory comment that
a scientist's competition is "very different" from an attorney's competition

to win a case. 4 9
Haack's contrasting of the role of lawyers and the role of scientists
to distinguish between law and science has two problems. First, while
the lawyer and the scientist may treat evidence differently in the way she
describes, Haack's description of the scientist's use of evidence seems
quite similar to the role judges plays in the legal process-disinterested in
either party, their role is to evaluate whatever evidence was appropriately
presented in the trial process and to come to an unbiased conclusion based
on that evidence. Comparing lawyers to scientists makes science look
unprejudiced and law comparatively biased, while another analogy is
equally available. Haack's comparison of the role of scientists to lawyers
simply illustrates that law's inquiry is adversarial while scientific inquiry
is not (or at least it is not as noticeably adversarial as adjudicative inquiry).
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Second, through her suggestion that even when scientists are
competitive they are still in the business of truth seeking, while lawyers'
competition is motivated by a desire to win a case, Haack portrays scientists
as benevolent and lawyers as partisan. By contrasting lawyers' competition
with scientific competition, Haack suggests that while scientists remain
ever committed to searching for truth, lawyers are impliedly committed to
something less valuable than that. This position seems unfairly critical of
lawyers' role as advocates, especially because the legitimacy of scientists
having different commitments than lawyers is unmentioned; indeed,
lawyers are not on a quest for empirical reality in the way that scientists
are, because the lawyer's purpose is to establish legal facts-and that is a
legitimate purpose.
Along with her comparison of scientists to lawyers, Haack comments
on the different time constraints that are relevant to both fields. She
suggests that while the legal system requires prompt and final resolutions,
science is openly fallible, a continuing progression-science simply takes
the time it takes. 0 Undeniably, adjudicative decisions are constrained
by time in a way that science may not be, but Haack concludes that this
difference between the two fields causes law to be overly demanding on
science (because law needs answers immediately, but the relevant science
could still be provisional). Adversarialism is again presented to be the root
of the tension between science and law: adversarialism (and the resultant
desire to win) convinces lawyers to get scientists as witnesses to assert
scientific authority for science that is still provisional. While overly zealous
advocacy may be a generalized problem of litigation, surely scientists who
are willing to assert scientific authority for provisional science must be
implicated as part of the problem.
Arguing that law's adversarial culture is at the root of the science
and law tension, Haack concludes that the adversarial process should
tolerate some adaptation to its procedures in order to accommodate
science better." Somewhat optimistically, she comments that legal culture
has adapted its process to accommodate the impact of adversarialism by
an (albeit modest) increased use of court-appointed experts. Critics of
increased use of court-appointed experts, Haack explains, suggest that
this is a move towards the inquisitorial system. While (understandably)
declining to get deeply involved in a comparison of inquisitorial legal
processes versus the adversarial, she suggests that arguments that express
50. Haack, "Entangled," supranote 1 at 256.
51. Haack, "Irreconcilable Differences," supra note I at 22, and Haack, "Truth and Justice," supra
note I at 156.
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a fear of the adversarial process becoming "inquisitorial" are essentially
melodramatic.52
Haack additionally presents the view of some authors that the
adversarial process is the fairest way to proceed where both parties
have an equal opportunity to present the evidence of their choosing."
She counters this criticism with a materialistic argument: there are often
economic barriers in the adversarial process that would allow one party to
call endless experts, but another party to be hard pressed to call even one.54
This, she suggests, would be difficult to call "fair." I agree. Economic
imbalances pose a problem for the adversarial process generally, but
this concern ought to be dealt with directly, not indirectly by altering the
adversarial process when it comes to scientific experts.
Summing up, Haack's presentation of the fundamental nature of
science and law consistently displays science as better than law. Next to
the image of science as a truth-seeking, impartial exercise, law is made to
look particularly flawed, even unethical. The adversarial process, however,
is defined almost exclusively by implication by comparing it to an image
of science as a fundamentally unbiased, progressive inquiry into truth, but
without exploring the nature of the legal process and its own legitimacy.
Haack compares science and law without mentioning that the internal
legitimacy of the legal process is premised on the law's internal definition
of legal facts and proof. Thereby, Haack engages in a comparison akin
to comparing apples to oranges on the criteria of which tastes more like
apples-of course the apple will appear better, and the orange will look
quite inadequate, but that conclusion results from a faulty comparison. The
comparison engendered a deferential tone towards science and a critical
tone towards law, culminating in the conclusion that adversarialism is
the problem, so to promote a better interaction between science and law,
changes to adversarial procedure should be tolerated. This conclusion
undervalues the significance of consistent adherence to legal procedure to
maintain the legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes.
My intention in this critique was to demonstrate the impact and
implications of underemphasizing the concept of procedural legitimacy
and its underpinnings when considering the science and law interaction.
I suggest that Edmond and Roach display a similar underemphasis,
although somewhat more subtly, which I hope to illustrate further in the
next section.
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2. Edmond and Roach: a contextual approach to the admissibilityof the
state forensic science and medical evidence"
It is the importance we ascribe to the presumption of innocence, to
avoiding the conviction of the innocent, the premium placed on fairness
and accuracy, the difficulty of challenging incriminating expert evidence
in the context of the accusatorial criminal trial, along with the very real
limitations of supposed trial safeguards (e.g. warnings to juries), that
encourage us to recommend the imposition of fairly onerous standards
in the determination of whether the state's forensic scientists (and other
experts) should be entitled to express incriminating opinion in the
criminal proceedings. 6
Edmond and Roach's contextual approach to admissibility of scientific
evidence in the criminal context leads them to suggest an innovative
alteration to admissibility determinations: asymmetrical admissibility of
evidence rules between the state and the defence. Under their approach,
where the state seeks to tender incriminating expert evidence, its
admissibility would be subject to a "demonstrable reliability" standard,
while defence expert evidence would be subject to a lesser standard."
Edmond and Roach suggest that their approach to admissibility
moves away from "invoking philosophically driven, idealized models of
science," and is instead shaped by legal principles and criminal justice
values.18 The authors define these values as "the presumption of innocence,
the need for the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
goal of preventing the conviction of the innocent."" Based on these
principles, Edmond and Roach suggest that an accused person should not
be confronted by unreliable or speculative expert opinion evidence.60 in
order for criminal procedures to be fair, therefore, the actual reliability
of incriminating expert opinion, scientific or otherwise, is fundamental.
Consequently, under Edmond and Roach's framework, all incriminating
expert evidence must be demonstrably reliable to be admissible.6'

55. Edmond & Roach, supranote 2.
56. Ibid at 403.
57. Ibid, generally. The demonstrable reliability approach to prosecutorial evidence was originally
developed in Gary Edmond, PathologicalScience? Demonstrable Reliability and Expert Forensic
Pathology Evidence (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 2007), prepared as a research paper for the
Goudge Inquiry [PathologicalScience].
58. Ibid at 345-346.
59. Ibid at 345.
60. Ibid at 387: "A right not to be confronted with unreliable or speculative expert-opinion evidence
would seem to embody the state's obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, demonstrate
commitment to fairness..."
61. Ibid at 345 and 406, for example.
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The justification for the asymmetrical approach comes from
pointing to two categories of inequities in the criminal trial context: (1)
lack of scientific literacy among lawyers and judges and (2) economic
imbalances that result in the state having much better access to experts
than defendants. To establish the lack of scientific literacy, Edmond and
Roach recount empirical studies that suggest that lawyers and judges are
unable to appreciate frailties in scientific evidence. As a consequence of
this incapacity "[t]he traditional tools of the adversarial process (crossexamination, opposing experts, instructions to juries)" are inadequate to
protect against the distorting effects of misleading experts.62
The authors point to economic disparity to account for why "[t]he
defense is typically an unarmed adversary that lacks expert assistance."6 3
Resource disparities result in the state having substantially better access
to forensic sciences than defendants. It is, therefore, more difficult for
defence counsel to obtain experts to counter the readily available experts
of the state, leaving state expert witnesses largely untested. Consequently,
not only is there no expert presenting a different view than the state expert,
defence counsel also do not have the benefit of an expert who can assist
them in preparing their cross-examination. Such untested evidence is
then presented to the judge, who is far from an expert herself, and has
only been presented with one side of the "expert story." The economic
and resource imbalances between the state and defence thus compromise
the fairness of the adversarial process, because, augmented by lack of
scientific literacy among legal players, the result is inadequate protection
of the accused person from being confronted with potentially improper
evidence. Edmond and Roach suggest that creating an asymmetry in
the admissibility onuses is a justifiable way to account for the practical
inequities that exist in the criminal trial process.6 This has the flavour of
a "two wrongs make a right" argument: the first "wrong" is the inequity
disfavouring the defence in criminal trials. Purporting to equalize this by
asymmetrizing admissibility criteria, making the state's expert evidence
subject to a more onerous standard is the second .wrong, stemming from

62. Ibid at 366.
63. Ibidat362.
64. The differential approach is also discussed in PathologicalScience, supra note 57 at 32: "This
paper contends that the highest admissibility standards for expert evidence should be applied to
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social, scientific or biomedical research. In consequence, the defence should not be burdened with the
same admissibility standards imposed upon the prosecution."
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an undervaluing of consistency in procedure as a requirement of achieving
legitimate adjudicative outcomes, as I will explain below.
Having suggested that the admissibility criteria should be asymmetric,
Edmond and Roach discuss the nature of the burden that should be placed
on Crown expert evidence. The authors comment that Crown "expert
evidence ought to be excluded on the grounds of unreliability or unknown
probative value,"" and conclude that it should be subject to a "demonstrable
reliability" standard at the admissibility stage.' The authors suggest that
the Daubert factors, being "focused on indicia of reliability," would be
useful in applying the legal standard of demonstrable reliability." Among
the Daubert criteria, the testing criterion, which would require the expert
evidence to have undergone some empirical assessment, is considered the
most important.68
Although they suggest that the Daubert criteria are helpful in
determining demonstrable reliability, Edmond and Roach do not subscribe
to the Daubert court's notion that the Daubert criteria are indicative
of scientific reliability, nor its idealized image of science or scientific
reliability.69 Discussing science as a type of evidence, the relevant concern
is not scientific reliability, but actual reliability.70 Consistent with their
express commitment that some concept of "scientific-ness," should not be
relevant to determining admissibility, Edmond and Roach maintain that
they do not argue for "strict application of Daubertto all proffers of expert
evidence nor derogation from those criteria according to 'non-science' and
'experience-based' classification. Rather, [they] are advocating greater
attention to evidence of reliability in every case of incriminating expert
opinion."'
A number of elements from Edmond and Roach's route are agreeable.
They fairly point out that "[i]n many ways, the questions of whether

65. Edmond & Roach, supra note 2 at 392.
66. See also, PathologicalScience, supra note 57 at 31. There, Edmond suggests that state evidence
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67. Edmond & Roach, supranote 2 at 400.
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criteria, and especially testing, are useful tools to approach legal reliability.
69. Edmond & Roach, supranote 2 at 396; and at 399: "We suggest that the Daubertcriteria do not
embody the essence of all authentic scientific inquiry."
70. As Edmond puts it in PathologicalScience, supranote 57 at 40: "The invocation of scientific
method doctrines and casting of empirical investigations as formal attempts at disproof should not
become prerequisites to determinations of legal reliability. Instead, questions of admissibility and
reliability should be focused on the more fundamental and legally significant question of whether the
expert evidence is demonstrably reliable."
71. Ibid at 404.
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Daubert embodies the essentials of genuine science and whether we
can develop useful means of demarcating science from other types of
knowledge and experience are distractions."72 I agree. They are distractions
because the relevant concern is not whether evidence is "scientific" or not,
so determining if the Daubert criteria appropriately characterize science
is non-essential. Moreover, as Edmond and Roach imply, expert evidence
should be treated consistently in the legal process whether the evidence
can be labelled scientific or not. That is, "non-science" or "experiencebased" expert evidence ought to be legally reliable just as scientific
expert evidence should. This is not to say that the legal reliability of all
evidence can be determined in the same way, but that it should be subject
to a consistent standard of reliability. This is consistent with my project of
avoiding an idealization of science that would result in scientific evidence
being treated differently than other types of evidence, on the basis
(erroneous or not) that it is understood to be science, and that constructs
typical of scientific inquiry, as set out in Daubert must not be applied
strictly to all types of evidence, as this would constitute an imposition of
scientific or science-like reasoning on legal determinations.
However, the special relevance that Edmond and Roach give to
empirical testing to establish demonstrable reliability may be a risky
preference for empirical reasoning. This has a perilous potential because
it may cause an inadvertent usurping of legal reasoning which does not
have an empirical design in the way that science does." This potential is
demonstrable by considering Edmond and Roach's proposed treatment of
the sociological evidence tendered in the R v Abbey decision.74
The trial judge in Abbey had excluded a sociologist's evidence related
to the potential meanings of a teardrop tattoo. The Court of Appeal
overturned the trial judge's attempt to impose Daubert-style admissibility
criteria on the expert's opinion: "sociologists don't employ the scientific
method, and they don't purport to."" The Court of Appeal in Abbey thus
presented a flexible approach to be applied to admissibility of evidence
that is not typically considered scientific.
Edmond and Roach, however, suggest that the sociological evidence
was not demonstrably reliable, so it would have been inadmissible under
their framework. They agree that the sociologist's expertise was properly
established, that it was appropriate for him to speak to the significance
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of teardrop tattoos among North American gangs generally, and that his
evidence was "to some extent, even empirically predicated."7 But they
were concerned that his evidence lacked demonstrable reliability, because
the extrapolation from North American gangs generally to Abbey's gang
specifically did not have empirical support."
At the Court of Appeal, the concern that the expert's opinion was
generally relevant to North American gangs was addressed by limiting
the scope of the sociologist's evidence. He was not permitted to testify
that the teardrop meant that the accused had murdered an opposing gang
member, but he could testify as to what teardrop tattoos tended to mean
among North American gangs. Edmond and Roach, however, consider this
a second-best solution, suggesting instead that without empirical support
for the extrapolation from general to specific, the evidence ought to be
entirely excluded.7 1 I interpret this as an excessively stringent approach to
admissibility that would have the effect of improperly preventing evidence
that is probative and otherwise admissible from reaching the trier of fact,
premised on an ardent commitment to empirical reasoning.
Undoubtedly, the legal system is not foundationally concerned with
whether there is a trend that a teardrop tattoo might mean a murder was
committed. Rather, the legal system is concerned with whether there is a
reasonable doubt that the accused committed a crime. Surely, evidence
indicative of a general tendency can be probative and relevant to making
that legal determination, but Edmond and Roach's approach would require
that the link between the sociologist's evidence and its applicability to the
specific issue at trial must be empirically established before the trier of
fact can even have access to the evidence. This approach problematically
equates probative value with an empirical demonstration of the relevance
of the evidence.
Consequently, Edmond and Roach's framework would prevent
probative evidence from entering the trial process, where arguments can
be advanced to convince the trier of fact of how much weight ought to be
accorded to the evidence of a general tendency. If evidence that meets the
requisite threshold of reliability (and that satisfies the rest of the Mohan
criteria) is not admitted on the ground that probative value is essentially
equated to an empirical demonstration of relevance, then the procedural
rules of admissibility are compromised, and the legitimacy of the resultant
adjudicative decision becomes questionable. The approach taken by the
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Court of Appeal in Abbey (which drew from the recommendations of the
Goudge Inquiry, discussed later) is preferable, because it would allow
probative evidence, properly limited in scope, to be considered by triers of
fact, who are then able to come to a legitimate legal determination based
on all the evidence properly presented to them, as well as the argument
relating to weight that should be given to the evidence.
For Edmond and Roach, however, demonstrable reliability
(underpinned largely by empirical reliability), although an onerous
standard, makes Crown evidence more legitimate. The more onerous
standard, they suggest, is a method of providing protection to the accused,
which is compromised due to practical inequities. The imposition of the
demonstrable reliability criteria on Crown evidence is, in a sense, an
attempt to restore some legitimacy to the criminal trial process. Edmond
and Roach appeal to criminal justice values as a justification for their
approach.
Edmond and Roach define criminal justice values exclusively in terms
of protection for the accused. Though the values suggested (prevention
of improper conviction, presumption of innocence, and requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt) are essential, there are other values that
must also be essential to the criminal justice process, like protection of
society, prevention of false acquittals, or deterrence of crime. The authors'
presentation of criminal justice values is imbalanced and, since criminal
justice values are the grounding of their position, their solution also reflects
a similar asymmetry.
Committed to the protection of the accused, the authors concentrate
on how detrimental the trial process is to the accused, causing them to
underemphasize that the burden of proof enormously favours the accused.
The authors do not consider the impact of their proposed asymmetrical
evidentiary standard on the burden of proof. This is a particularly
problematic oversight, because the burden of proof (itself a representation
of criminal justice values) is part of the substantive criminal law that
dictates what standard of proof the evidence must attain in order for
an element of an offence to be legally proven. It represents what lawmakers have decided is the appropriate distribution of error, as described
above. These authors do not consider that their position undermines
the substantive burden of proof by making it more difficult to meet by
amending the admissibility of evidence rules. As Laudan has persuasively
argued, using evidence rules to make it more difficult to show guilt is an
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unprincipled use of evidence law, because the burden of proof is already
established by the relevant substantive law.7 9
As explained above, legitimate adjudicative decisions result when
evidence is appropriately presented to the trier of fact, who then evaluates
the evidence in relation to the appropriate burden of proof, as defined by
law-makers. Presentation of evidence is governed by admissibility rules,
so appropriate application of admissibility rules is essential to maintaining
legitimate adjudicative decisions. I suggest that altering the procedural
admissibility rules through which evidence is presented to the trier of fact
is an unjustifiable compromise to legal procedure. The authors overlook
this essential principle because of their (creditable) overemphasis on
protection of the accused and their desire to prevent factually inaccurate
convictions. Of course, wrongful convictions are extremely undesirable.
That is why law-makers established the standard of proof for criminal
conviction as proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than something
closer to the civil standard of a balance of probabilities.
To sum up, the inspiration for Edmond and Roach's approach is the
creditable goal of preventing factually incorrect convictions. Applied to
the science and law discussion, the authors suggest that inequities in the
criminal trial process that are detrimental to the accused can be legitimized
by imposing asymmetrical admissibility criteria for expert evidence that
favours the accused. While defence expert evidence may be subject to
some lesser standard, the Crown's incriminating expert evidence would be
subject to a demonstrable reliability standard. Demonstrable reliability is
largely informed by empirical testing, typically associated with scientific
inquiry. As such, I suggest that these authors make use of science-like
constructs to reintroduce legitimacy into the trial process. By suggesting a
more strict admissibility criteria for Crown evidence, the authors attempt
to interfere with the rules governing admissibility of evidence by making
it harder for the Crown to meet its burden of proof.
Understandably, because Edmond and Roach take note of inequities
that disadvantage the accused in the criminal trial process, they become
compelled to somehow advantage the accused in order to restore equity.
While the goal is understandable, attempting to achieve that goal by
introducing adaptations to admissibility rules that would effectively make
the prosecution's standard of proof more difficult to attain, does not seem
suitable. There are a number of other solutions that may be more direct
methods of facilitating better protection of the accused. Most drastically,
better protection of the accused could be achieved by advocating for an
79.

Laudan, supra note 29 at 124.
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increase in the standard of proof required to convict an accused person
in order to increase the protection of the accused. This approach, though
seemingly extreme, would be less detrimental to the legitimacy of the legal
process compared to changing procedural rules with a design to change
the substantive burden of proof. Besides this approach, directly addressing
the economic and resource imbalances that Edmond and Roach point to,
and which Haack alluded to as well, warrants increased consideration.so
I have suggested that Susan Haack's approach reflects a commitment
to factual accuracy and a deference to science as a better inquiry into
factual accuracy than law. Edmond and Roach's approach, I suggest, has
demonstrated an overcommitment to empirical legitimacy. I do not intend
to suggest that the utility of scientific evidence in determining legal facts,
the protection of the accused and ensuring reliance on reliable evidence
are improper commitments. Moreover, I do not suggest that accurate factfinding is wholly unimportant to law-clearly, the burdens of proof require
some degree of certainty. Accuracy in fact-finding is important because
fact-finding is the basis of adjudicative decisions that protect substantive
rights and enforce substantive laws.
What is problematic, however, is an underemphasis on procedural
legitimacy, or the notion that consistent adherence to legal procedure is
essential to maintaining legitimate adjudicative outcomes. Procedural
legitimacy acknowledges that adjudicative outcomes are made in conditions
of factual uncertainty, so it is inevitable that from time to time, a legal fact
will not correspond with factual reality, and an adjudicative outcome will be
inconsistent with what really happened in fact. Given these circumstances,
adherence to legal procedure ensures legitimate adjudicative outcomes.
Considering the significance of consistent adherence to legal procedure,
an underemphasis on procedural legitimacy in preference for substantive
concerns can result in inappropriate procedural compromise.
Therefore, I suggest that the effort to obtain the best benefits of scientific
or other expert evidence must be undertaken with the understanding that
consistent application of legal procedure is significant in maintaining the
legitimacy of the adjudicative system generally, as well as the legitimacy
of individual legal outcomes. As I will demonstrate in the next part, the
recommendations in the Goudge Inquiry can be endorsed on this basis:
80. Susan Haack and Edmond & Roach point to economic and resource disparities that compromise
the utility and fairness of the trial process, particularly the usefulness of cross-examination. Surely
where one party is not appropriately resourced, the adversarial process is imbalanced. I have suggested
that this imbalance should not be addressed by tampering with legal procedures or procedural rules.
It should be tackled-not only in the science and law context, but in the broader context of access to
justice, though it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so.
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the utility of science to the adjudicative process is appreciated, but it is
not recommended that the legal process display any submissiveness to it.
IV. Procedurallegitimacy appliedto the science and law interaction
The principle that the legal system maintains legitimacy through adherence
to procedure must be kept in mind when considering how science and
law interact. If procedural rules (which includes rules of admissibility of
evidence) are distorted in order to accommodate science, then law's own
source of legitimacy can be compromised. As such, while it is tempting
to look to science as a source of legitimacy for adjudicative decisions,
overreliance upon and overdeference to science or scientific constructs
can be detrimental to the legal process. Of course, this is not to say that
science is wholly nonuseful to the legal process. Without a doubt, scientific
evidence can be relevant, probative, and necessary. Along with its benefits,
however, science also has a potential prejudicial impact, as articulated
in Mohan and subsequent decisions. Bearing in mind the principle of
legitimacy via procedure in the legal process and the benefit and potential
prejudice that science can have, how ought the legal system to accept and
use scientific contribution without drifting into any self-compromise?
The Goudge Inquiry Report is a useful guide to utilizing science
appropriately in the courtroom without compromising the integrity of the
legal process. The recommendations provided in the Report are a balanced
recognition of the probative but also prejudicial impact of scientific
evidence. In the upcoming section, I endorse the recommendations on the
basis of their consistency with the principle of procedural legitimacy.
The Goudge Inquiry was convened to investigate the wrongful
convictions that occurred in relation to suspicious deaths of children in
Ontario. Noting that forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Smith had provided
expert testimony in many of the cases that were found to contain
miscarriages of justice, the Goudge Inquiry Report includes a chapter
devoted to "how the legal system can regulate the behavior of expert
witnesses and, in particular, the vital gatekeeping role of trial judges."8 '
The Goudge Inquiry highlighted two major areas that judges ought
to be particularly mindful of while gatekeeping at the admissibility stage.
First, judges are called on to clearly and precisely define the scope of the
witnesses' expertise, and to police the boundaries of the expertise during
the expert's testimony.82 Second, judges must assess threshold reliability
for all expert evidence at the admissibility stage.83 Carefully considering
81.
82.
83.

Goudge Inquiry, supra note 3 at 471.
Ibid, generally, and see specifically 471-475.
Ibid, generally, and see specifically 477-480.
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the scope of expertise as well as undertaking threshold reliability analyses
are squarely grounded in the Mohan construct for admissibility of expert
evidence. Thus, rather than compromising the pre-existing admissibility
rules, Goudge J.A.'s recommendations serve to enhance the application of
these rules, as I will further explain below.
1. Defining scope of expertise at the admissibilitystage
Justice Goudge's study revealed that on numerous occasions, Dr. Smith had
been permitted to give opinions well beyond the scope of his expertise, 84
prompting the recommendation that scope of expertise should be carefully
scrutinized and defined at the admissibility stage, and diligently policed
thereafter. This recommendation is entirely consistent with the four-part
Mohan analysis. When experts give opinions beyond their expertise, they
violate the qualification requirement, as well as the general exclusionary
rule prohibiting lay witnesses from tendering opinion evidence. Moreover,
if experts testify beyond their scope of expertise, the testimony becomes
particularly prejudicial because the unqualified opinion could be given
excessive weight due to the erroneous assumption of expertise. As Sopinka
J. apprehensively commented in Mohan, "impressive antecedents" can
improperly sway juries-it is all the more prejudicial when the impressive
antecedents do not relate to the opinion tendered.
Entertaining an alternative solution, Justice Goudge considers the
appropriateness of relying on instructions to the jury to give less weight
to evidence that is beyond the scope of the witness's expertise. Noting
that it is very difficult for juries to "tune out" evidence they heard at trial
when coming to their decision, Justice Goudge concludes that front-end
gatekeeping in respect of scope of expertise is more desirable than relying
on jury charges after the fact." Not only is this a justifiable conclusion; it
is necessary, based on the principle of procedural legitimacy.
An expert who tenders an opinion beyond the scope of their expertise
constitutes a lay witness who tenders opinion evidence. The result is a
violation of the Mohan criteria for admissibility of expert testimony and of
the general rule that opinion evidence is inadmissible. Neither the Mohan
analysis nor the general rule ofexclusion of opinion evidence require that the
trier of fact give less weight to opinion evidence; they require that opinion
evidence does not come before the trier of fact at all (i.e., lay opinions
are inadmissible evidence). If evidence that violates admissibility rules is
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid at 474. In noting the jury's difficulty in tuning out evidence heard at trial, Goudge J refers
to the comments of Professor Erica Beecher-Monas and Professor Gary Edmond, both of whom
expressed this sentiment during the course of the inquiry.
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admitted, the validity of the resulting adjudicative decision is questionable
due to a procedural impropriety, whether or not juries are later instructed
to give less weight to the evidence. Consequently, an adjudicative decision
that is based on the testimony of an expert that was given beyond their
scope of expertise could be invalid because such evidence should never
have been presented to the jury. Front-end gatekeeping in respect of scope
of expertise is a sound and useful recommendation.
Justice Goudge's conclusion that scope of expertise, being an issue
of admissibility, requires vigilant front-end gate-keeping bears in mind
the potential for prejudice that science brings with it (i.e., the potential
for distorting fact-finding due to presentation by distinguished experts). It
is also consistent with procedural legitimacy-failing to define scope of
expertise at the admissibility stage would violate the Mohan analysis for
admissibility of expert evidence, as well as the general rule prohibiting
admission of the opinion evidence of lay witnesses.
2. Determiningthresholdreliability: avoiding idealization ofscience
Calling on judges to assess the threshold reliability of expert evidence at the
admissibility stage, Justice Goudge demonstrates that such an apporach is
implied throughout the Mohan analysis."6 Threshold reliability is relevant
to weighing probative value against prejudicial effect of evidence, as
unreliable evidence is less probative and more prejudicial. Thus, balancing
probative value against prejudicial effect is required when determining
whether evidence has legal relevance under the Mohan analysis. Similarly,
if the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs its probative value, the
evidence can be excluded for that reason alone, as this is a stand alone
exclusionary rule. As such, determining threshold reliability is relevant to
whether "any other exclusionary rule applies." Third, threshold reliability
is relevant to the necessity requirement, as evidence that does not meet a
threshold level of reliability cannot be said to be of assistance to the trier
of fact. 7
Justice Goudge thus demonstrates that threshold reliability is an
essential component of the Mohan analysis. That being the case, the
existing admissibility rules are not compromised by his urging that judges
assess threshold reliability carefully when determining admissibility of
evidence. Instead, this recommendation enhances the application of the
Mohan analysis because it serves as a reminder that threshold reliability is
relevant at the various stages of admissibility analysis. The Goudge Report

86.
87.

Ibid at 477-480.
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provides a number of related recommendations designed to assist judges
with determining threshold reliability. These recommendations too serve
to make the Mohan analysis more employable, and pertinent to scientific
evidence.
Commenting on what tools judges might use to assist them in
determining threshold reliability, Justice Goudge endorses the view that
the Daubert factors can have the beneficial effect of ensuring that expert
evidence adheres to a "scientific method that emphasizes testing and peer
review and that is conscious of known or potential error rates, as a means
of attempting to ensure the reliability of expert evidence."" However, he
is careful to acknowledge that many types of expert evidence may not
be amenable to empirical analysis: "Testing and error rates are optimal,
but it is important to reiterate that many kinds of expert opinion are not
readily susceptible to empirical testing or reproducibility. The inability to
provide testing results does not necessarily render these kinds of expert
evidence unreliable." 9 These comments suggest that while scientific
constructs (which the Daubert factors embody) may be useful, they
should not be overapplied. Justice Goudge is consistent that in making
threshold admissibility determinations, science can be appreciated without
overreliance on it.
Along with his general comments on the Daubert criteria, Justice
Goudge provides a list of factors relevant to determining threshold
reliability. The list recommends considering the scientific reliability of a
theory or technique that an expert opinion is grounded on. Questions to
ask in this respect include: "whether [the scientific theory or technique] is
generally accepted; whether there are meaningful peer review, professional
standards, and quality assurance processes; and whether the expert can
relate his or her particular opinion in the case to a theory or technique
that has been or can be tested, including substitutes for testing that are
tailored to the particular discipline.""o Similar to his general comments
relating to the Daubertcriteria, these factors demonstrate Justice Goudge's
appreciation that scientific reliability can be a relevant consideration in
determining threshold reliability, but that scientific constructs may not be
applicable to all evidence, and should not be applied without discerning
whether the evidence is amenable to scientific testing.
The Goudge recommendations thus allow for the use of scientific
constructs within the legal determination of threshold reliability, but refrain

88.
89.
90.

Ibidat 481.
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from idealizing scientific constructs such that they replace the legal concept
of threshold reliability. As such, while the utility of scientific reliability is
not wholly ignored, law's own procedural rules are uncompromised. This
commitment to the legal system's procedures is additionally apparent in the
reminder that the trial judge's role is to determine threshold reliabilitythe trial judge does not need to be convinced of the ultimate reliability of
the evidence at the admissibility stage."
3. Threshold vs ultimate reliability: maintainingprocedurallegitimacy
Justice Goudge's additional factors for consideration reflect his cognizance
of the important distinction between threshold reliability and ultimate
reliability. This is because they take into account the second stage of
evidentiary analysis where the trier of fact assigns weight to evidence, and
considers the ultimate reliability of the evidence 92:
whether there is a serious dispute or uncertainty about the science and, if
so, whether the trieroffact will be reliably informed about the existence

of that uncertainty
whether experts can express the opinion in a manner such that the trier
offact will be able to reach an independent opinion as to the reliability

of the expert opinion. [emphasis added]
These factors contain the implicit recognition that at the admissibility
stage, trial judges should examine the admissibility of evidence, bearing
in mind that the trier of fact is yet to assign weight to the evidence; in other
words, the evidentiary analysis is not over at the admissibility stage. Rather
than determining admissibility entirely on the basis of reliability, Justice
Goudge suggests that judges consider whether the trier of fact will be able
to appropriately weigh the evidence when determining admissibility. What
this recognizes is that considerations at the admissibility stage are designed
to ensure that the trier of fact receives appropriate evidence, which can
then be weighed against the relevant burden of proof and a substantive
decision arrived at in accordance with adversarial procedure.
Evidence that attains a threshold level of reliability should be presented
to the trier of fact, who will then determine ultimate reliability when the
evidence is weighed prior to making a substantive decision. As such, it
would be inappropriate for the trial judge to make a judgment about the
ultimate reliability of evidence at the admissibility stage, because that
ignores the fact that evidence that attains threshold reliability (along with
91.
92.
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Ibid at 495.
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satisfying the other Mohan criteria) is appropriate for the trier of fact to
receive, weigh and use in order to make the substantive decision. While it
is appropriate for the trial judge to consider whether the trier of fact will
be informed of uncertainties in evidence, the trial judge does not have to
solve these uncertainties herself. In accordance with a proper application
of admissibility rules, that task must be left to the trier of fact at the
weighing of evidence stage.
In that light, it would be inappropriate for the trial judge to have to be
convinced of the scientific reliability of the evidence at the admissibility
stage, because such a standard exceeds the threshold reliability
determination. Scientific reliability and scientific constructs may become
more strenuously applicable at trial, as counsel attempts to convince juries
of the amount of weight to accord to scientific evidence. Still, even when
ultimate reliability is being assessed, scientific reasoning must not usurp
legal reasoning. As discussed above, law and science seek to establish
different things, and their respective procedures facilitate the achievement
of those different goals. A strict reliance on scientific constructs to answer
legal questions is an inappropriate utilization of science in the legal
process.93
In an effort to avoid overreliance on scientific constructs to make legal
determinations in cases where significant scientific evidence is tendered,
jury charges could include a reminder to them of the difference between
the scientific and legal proofs. Justice Goudge endorses the use of model
jury charges published by the Canadian Judicial Council "in cases where
expert evidence is important." He suggests as well that where appropriate,
judges could provide "structured questions to assist the jury in determining
ultimate reliability," similar to the questions that the trial judge would have
asked at the admissibility stage. The recommendations further provide that
judges should remind jurors to use their common sense to decide whether
to accept all, some or any of an expert's testimony. 94 I generally agree
with these suggestions; however, asking jurors to use common sense may
not be enough of a safeguard to prevent their overreliance on scientific
constructs. Juries must not idealize science, either by way of being overly
deferential to scientific experts, or by equating scientific fact with legal
fact. In respect of the latter, jury charges ought to make clear that applying
the evidence presented at trial to the relevant burden of proof proves a
legal "fact," and arriving at a legal "fact" is not a scientific inquiry, and
does not require scientific proof.
93.
94.

See Part III (2).
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4. Utility of adversarialprocess
Drawing a distinction between threshold and ultimate reliability contains
the implicit acknowledgement that evidence that meets a threshold level
of reliability is yet to undergo the scrutiny of the adversarial procedure,
where ultimate reliability can be more fully explored. This reflects Justice
Goudge's assurance that the adversarial process is a legitimate and useful
one for determining ultimate reliability, and this is a welcome sentiment
compared to the tone of dissatisfaction towards the adversarial procedure
expressed by Haack and Edmond and Roach.
Justice Goudge's commitment to the utility of the adversarial process
is more expressly evident in his discussion of the role of court-appointed
or joint experts, which has been recommended from time to time. The
Goudge Inquiry does not recommend these solutions, suggesting instead
that "one of the benefits of an adversarial system is its ability, through
properly resourced and informed cross-examination and presentation of
evidence, to best reveal and illuminate areas of scientific controversy."95
He recommends, therefore, the effective use of the adversarial system,
rather than painting it as the flaw that causes science to get distorted when
the two fields interact. And, in an effort to maintain and enhance the
utility of the adversarial process, Justice Goudge recommends that a trial
judge ought to ensure that existing disclosure provisions are complied
with so that the adversarial process can operate ideally, "ensuring that all
parties are fully prepared and informed, and, as a result, can effectively
test the expert testimony presented."96
5. Recommendation regardingeducation
Cognizant of the heavy burden that his recommendations place on trial
judges, both in defining the scope of an expert's testimony and determining
threshold reliability, Goudge J. acknowledges that their continued
education is vital to his recommendations being successful.97 I would add
to this that if cross-examination is to be understood as a useful means
of illuminating scientific controversy, then lawyers' continued education
is necessary as well. Experts being questioned by lawyers who have a
limited understanding of the expert's field may distort the evidence due to
95. ]bid at 506.
96. 1bid at 508.
97. In order to play their role of vigilant gate-keeper role, Goudge J recommends that while judges
cannot be expected to resolve scientific controversies, they can "learn to understand what constitutes
good and bad science...and the frailties and limits of science." He recommends the National Judicial
Institute to consider developing additional programs for judicial education on scientific reliability
and scientific method, and for the Canadian Judicial Council to prepare a Canadian equivalent to the
Reference Manual on Scientfic Evidence that exists in the United States.
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the lawyer's ignorance of that expert's field, coupled with their aptitude
for cross-examination tactics.
It may also be desirable for judges' and the bar's continuing education
to bring to their attention their susceptibility to overdeference to science.
As I have tried to point out, if science is seen as something ideal, and law
as something less than that, then it is only natural to look to science to bring
legitimacy to adjudicative fact-finding and decision-making. Looking to
science for legitimacy can cause legal players to be overly demanding on
science, and seek answers that science is not able to provide, and this can
contribute to the distorting impact that science can have on fact-finding.
Looking to science in this way can cause unprincipled and unnecessary
overreliance on science to legitimize adjudicative decisions-the same
type of overreliance that Sopinka J. feared would prejudice the fact-finding
process.
6. Overview
Justice Goudge's recommendations account for the potential prejudice of
scientific evidence by calling on judges to scrutinize the qualifications of
experts and determine the threshold reliability of expert evidence at the
admissibility stage. Both recommendations are grounded in the Mohan
admissibility analysis for expert evidence, so the recommendations do
not alter the pre-existing admissibility rules. Instead, judges are called on
to do cogently what the Mohan admissibility analysis requires of them,
particularly in the case of scientific evidence, where the potential for
prejudicial impact may be amplified. Far from altering the procedural rules
governing admissibility, the Goudge Inquiry's recommendations ensure
that admissibility rules are being appropriately applied, and the triers of
fact are being provided with appropriate evidence. This is essential to
obtaining procedurally sound, valid adjudicative decisions.
The distinction between threshold and ultimate reliability is important
for judges to keep in mind in order to appropriately apply procedural
admissibility rules. Although admissibility rules can generally be
understood as exclusionary rules, they can be interpreted as rules designed
to ensure that juries are permitted to hear evidence that they ought to hear.
If evidence is too strenuously screened at the admissibility stage (i.e., a
judge seeks ultimate reliability or scientific reliability of evidence before
allowing evidence into the trial process), then the trier of fact will not
have the opportunity to consider evidence that ought to be considered,
and the adjudicative decision could thereby be invalid. Thus, as Goudge J.
recommends, scientific constructs may be useful in the threshold reliability
determination, but judges ought to be careful not to overapply scientific
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constructs in determining threshold reliability. An overly strict application
of scientific constructs at admissibility stage will take the judge into a
more strenuous analysis than threshold reliability requires.
Finally, the utility of the adversarial process should be appreciated
and enhanced rather than altered with a view to better accommodate
science. The enhancement can be facilitated by: providing experts with
codes of conduct clarifying that their role is to assist the court, not to
advocate for a party"; providing juries with charges that assist them in
preventing overdeference to distinguished experts99 and overreliance on
scientific constructs; ensuring that disclosure principles are complied
with so that cross-examination occurs in as informed a way as possibleo;
and increased education for all legal players. These enhancements to the
existing adversarial procedure are all likely to improve the legal. system's
ability to understand and use science.
Conclusion
By idealizing science as a better truth-seeking enterprise than law, and
failing to appreciate the role of procedure in maintaining the legitimacy of
the legal system, science itself and scientific reasoning can be an alluring
source of legitimacy for adjudicative decisions. In an effort to move away
from idealization of science and towards an appropriate appreciation of it,
I have attempted to outline how procedure can maintain the legitimacy of
scientific inquiry, and more fundamentally to my project, to adjudicative
outcomes. The culmination of the discussion surrounding procedural
legitimacy was that while both science and law maintain legitimacy
through adherence to their rules and procedures, both fields have different
needs and goals.
Science seeks to understand empirical realities, or truths. Still, it
inherently acknowledges, through the concept of falsification, that it
cannot prove truths with absolute certainty. Despite these conditions of
uncertainty, the inquiry into truth remains valid and "scientific" so long
as it complies with the rules and procedures relevant to science, known
as the scientific method. Law, on the other hand, seeks to establish legal
facts, which are defined in the substantive law. The definition of legal facts
includes the burden of proof required to prove a legal fact. The burdens
of proof allow legal facts to be proven for legal purposes even if there is
some uncertainty as to whether the legal fact really occurred or not. But
even when the uncertainty manifests (i.e., a fact is found for legal purposes
98. Ibid at 503.
99. Ibidat5ll.
100. Ibid at 507.
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that is not a fact in reality), the adjudicative decision that results remains
valid as long as procedural rules were followed.
Understanding science and law as similar, yet different, in this way is
critical to determining how the legal system should accept and use science.
The critiques of the commentaries of Susan Haack and Edmond Roach were
intended to demonstrate the impact of failing to recognize the principle
of procedural legitimacy. Although these commentators provided useful
insights in their contributions, their discussions and resulting conclusions
reflect a misappreciation of procedural legitimacy.
Finally, I have applied the concept of procedural legitimacy to
the science and law discussion in the form of an endorsement of the
recommendations put forward in the Goudge Inquiry. The Goudge Inquiry
is neither overly deferential to science, nor does it ignores science's
usefulness to the legal process; it neither rebukes the legal process as
being incapable of dealing with science, nor does it fail to recognize its
vulnerabilities. Consequently, the recommendations arising from the
Goudge Inquiry are principled and balanced, and I have endorsed them
on the basis that they are wholly consistent with the concept of procedural
legitimacy.

